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The European Union and its energy security challenges: engagement
through and with networks
Rafael Leal-Arcasa*, Juan Alemany Ríosb** and Costantino Grassob***
aEuropean and International Economic Law, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University
of London, London, UK; bCentre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London,
London, UK
Energy security remains a vital issue for the European Union (EU), even more so in the wake of
the events that unfolded in early 2014 in Ukraine. The EU’s already fragile position in the
international energy arena in terms of security of supply appears to be more uncertain than
ever after its umpteenth fallout with its historic energy supplier, Russia. This situation is
untenable and calls for swift and decisive action to adequately tackle the issue once and for
all. The article looks at the creation of a single EU energy market through the integration of
energy networks in the EU. This article then examines various ways to diversify its energy
supply, whether through increasing the import of liqueﬁed natural gas or through its
relations with the Eurasian Union. It then explores the International Energy Charter as an
example of the EU’s engagement with transnational policy networks. It concludes that from
energy transit, to technology transfer, to investment protection, energy and trade present
interplays across various ﬁelds. Improvements can be made to the EU trading system to
ensure greater energy security and more efﬁcient energy markets.
Keywords: EU; energy security; single EU energy market; energy supply; natural gas;
Eurasian Customs Union
1. Introduction
Energy security remains a vital issue for the European Union (EU), even more so in the wake of
the events that unfolded in early 2014 in Ukraine. The EU’s already fragile position in the inter-
national energy arena in terms of supply security appears to be more uncertain than ever after an
umpteenth fallout with its historic energy supplier, Russia. This situation is untenable and calls for
swift and decisive action to adequately tackle the issue once and for all.
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In addition to the EU’s energy dependence on the outside world,1 other considerable difﬁcul-
ties exist. Firstly, the current regulatory framework on global energy governance is largely multi-
layered and fragmented (Leal-Arcas & Filis, 2013a). The absence of both a single international
organization that regulates global energy governance as well as a single agreement governing
energy in a comprehensive manner contribute to this legal vacuum at the international stage on
a crucial issue. Moreover, the disparate energy realities of the EU member states further aggravate
this lack of cohesiveness within the EU itself by hindering a regional and comprehensive response
from the EU (Leal-Arcas & Filis, 2013b, p. 1241).
If effective energy security is to be attained by breaking the Russian stronghold on energy
supplies, the EU will need to mobilize multiple courses of action, both internally and externally.
These measures should seek to enhance the governance of energy trade in order to foster energy
security. We shall suggest measures and models which could normatively encourage this.
First, we will argue that the establishment of a single EU energy market could entail notable
beneﬁts in terms of global energy security through the interconnection of grids and transit rules
with other regional energy markets.
Moreover, we shall contend that the diversiﬁcation of energy supply sources should be a
prime concern for the EU. In that sense, all EU member states should seek to trade with as
many suppliers as possible. For instance, European countries should aim to import more liqueﬁed
natural gas (LNG) from an array of emerging energy exporters such as Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia
or the USA, for instance. Consequently, the EU should invest in the construction of LNG term-
inals scattered all over the European continent.2 Additionally, the construction of (abandoned, in
some cases) alternative pipelines and energy routes, such as the Trans-Adriatic pipeline (TAP),
the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP), Nabucco, South Stream or the Trans-Saharan gas
pipeline, should be encouraged as a means to broaden energy trade relations and diversify
energy imports. The idea of creating an EU energy union may help make all of this possible.
Finally, we shall argue that the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) has considerable potential to
play a determining role in attaining effective EU energy security. This could be the case were
the ECT to be thoroughly revised and strengthened in order to effectively address today’s
energy security challenges. Moreover, expanding the Energy Charter’s membership to energy-
rich countries in the Middle East, North Africa and the Economic Community of West African
States might enhance EU energy security through the creation of infrastructure that will boost
international, long-distance trade in energy. In that vein, as of October 2014, the fourth round
of negotiations regarding the creation of an International Energy Charter had been concluded.3
The International Energy Charter is intended to be formally adopted and signed at a Ministerial
Conference in The Hague in 2015. This declaration reﬂects the ambition of the Energy Charter to
play an important role in the evolving architecture of global energy governance, well beyond the
initial Eurasian steps.
After this introduction, the article will look at the creation of a single EU energy market
through the integration of energy networks in the EU. This article will then examine various
ways to diversify its energy supply, whether through increasing the import of LNG or through
its relations with the Eurasian Union and explore the International Energy Charter as an
example of the EU’s engagement with transnational policy networks (TPNs).
2. The creation of a single EU energy market
2.1. General overview
Whilst the EU, in general, relies on the outside world for over half of its primary energy needs, the
landscape changes vastly from one member state to another (e.g. Denmark is entirely self-sustain-
ing, as it covers the totality of its energy needs through its own production, whilst Malta is
2 Rafael Leal-Arcas et al.
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completely dependent on energy supplies from abroad).4 These acute disparities in energy reali-
ties within the 28 EU member states lead to a certain fragmentation which hampers cohesive EU
policy-making. In addition, the versatile nature of energy further exacerbates this cleavage, as
certain aspects of energy fall within EU exclusive competence5 or shared competence6
between the EU and its member states, whilst others ﬁrmly remain within the sole competence
of member states. Therefore, the EU faces unique challenges, at the moment of taking decisions
on the international stage, that are inherent to its one-of-a-kind legal nature and which are not
encountered by any other sizeable global actor, such as the USA or Japan, for instance (Leal-
Arcas, 2008, p. 70).
Notwithstanding the traditional perception of energy policy as a profoundly delicate question
that should be left to the individual discretion of each EU member state, the interdependence
between EU member states in this particular ﬁeld has never been so strong in political, economic
and technical terms (Delors, Nilsson, Andoura, & Buffetaut, 2012, p. 2). For instance, Germany’s
unilateral decision to switch off nuclear power plants without consultation, in the wake of the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, triggered the decoupling of energy prices between
Germany and the Netherlands on one side, and France and Belgium, on the other (Palle, 2013,
p. 9). The EU is at a decisive juncture that calls for a comprehensive and solidarity-oriented
approach in energy. If such a resolution is to be achieved,
the Europeans need to collectively move on, consigning to the history books their ‘energy patriotism’,
their permanent dithering which has led to a situation where it is no longer clear who of the Union and
its member states guarantees the shared interests of the peoples of Europe. (Delors, Andoura, & Der-
devet, 2013)
The creation of the EU ensued from the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, concluded in 1951 between the six EU founding member states (Belgium, France, West
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). At the time, this was an unprecedented agree-
ment which guaranteed cooperation among these nations in order to assure peace but also prevent
competition between European countries over energy resources.7 In that sense, the European
Commission has, on several occasions, prompted EU member states to remain loyal to the
EU’s roots: ‘Europe needs to act now, together, to deliver sustainable, secure and competitive
energy. In doing so, the EU would return to its roots (… ) the founding member states saw the
need for a common approach to energy.’8
For a long time, EU energy policy has exclusively targeted the establishment of the internal
energy market for gas and electricity, or the so-called European energy union, with the strong
belief that such a development would reduce energy prices as well as promote energy security,
by pushing for the gradual integration of national markets (Andoura, 2013). The advent of the
Lisbon Treaty enabled the enshrinement of the concept of solidarity in Article 194.1 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which introduces the TFEU’s Title
XXI on energy. Even though Article 194.1 TFEU expressly calls for solidarity among member
states in, inter alia, the attainment of effective energy security supply, this provision fails to
endow EU institutions with the effective legislative means to fulﬁll this goal (Leal-Arcas &
Filis, 2013a). In spite of this unfortunate deﬁciency, the EU gained a formal legal basis from
which to derive an energy infrastructure policy as a means to accomplish a true internal energy
market, a development which would constitute an undoubtedly important step towards energy
security (Palle, 2013, p. 4).
The completion of a single EU energy market was set to be accomplished by 2014, with the
aspiration that no EU member state would remain isolated from gas and electricity networks after
2015.9 Taking into account the crucial importance of the energy sector for Europe’s competitive-
ness, welfare and energy independence, the EU cannot afford failure.10 Moreover, a 2014 study
Contemporary Politics 3
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by the European Commission projected that, were this internal energy market to be effectively
created, it would entail a net economic beneﬁt ranging from €16 billion to €30 billion per year
(Booz & Company et al., 2013, p. 4).
In sum, the very disparate realities of each EU member state and the myopic pursuit of
national interests are proving detrimental to the quest for effective EU energy security. Were
EU member states to agree to cooperate and act within a ‘spirit of solidarity’ (as enshrined in
Article 194.1 TFEU), thus enabling the EU to speak with a single voice, this longed-for compre-
hensive and regional approach would certainly prove more effective than a myriad of individual
and national measures, thereby increasing the EU’s bargaining power at the global stage.
2.2. Integration of energy markets between EU member states
For many years, the EU has encouraged the development of energy networks in a variety of ways:
(1) by ﬁnancing, at the European level, the construction of trans-European energy networks;11
(2) by adopting measures in order to foster the liberalization and opening up of electricity and
gas markets;12 and
(3) by creating specialized European bodies to facilitate cooperation between transmission
system operators (TSOs)13 and energy regulators, such as the Agency for the Cooperation
of Energy Regulators (ACER).
The EU’s Third Energy Package,14 adopted in 2009, provides the EU with the necessary regulat-
ory and legislative tools to complete a single EU energy market. More speciﬁcally, this legislative
package tackles issues such as ownership unbundling,15 regulatory oversight and cooperation,
network cooperation, transparency, record keeping and access to storage facilities and LNG term-
inals by regulating transmission network ownership; ensuring more effective regulatory over-
sight; reinforcing consumer protection; regulating third-party access to gas storage; and
promoting regional solidarity among EU member states in the event of a severe disruption of
gas supply.16
In spite of calls (Delors & Nilsson, 2012) being made by reputed pundits and think tanks (such
as Notre Europe, for instance) to promote a common response at the EU level through top-down
measures17 in order to achieve the completion of the internal energy market, to engage in such a
movement straight ahead might prove counter-productive. Indeed, successful past experiences
demonstrate that a regional, bottom-up18 dynamic seems to be more suitable to tackle the
issues encountered by the actors involved in the internal energy market, as the latter generally
prefer to work with their neighbours, with whom they tend to share common interests and hard-
ships, rather than at the EU level, where it is often difﬁcult to reach a common position (Palle,
2013, pp. 5–6).
That said, the ultimate objective still remains the successful establishment of a fully ﬂedged
single EU energy market. Nonetheless, one may argue that the progressive integration of Euro-
pean energy markets through regional initiatives appears to be a more feasible route towards
this goal than the imposition of binding EU targets, which could disregard national circumstances.
Therefore, a collective response is indeed necessary at the EU level. However, given the multi-
faceted nature of energy and the divergent realities surrounding each EU member state, a truly
European response might be best achieved through a gradual blending of regional enterprises
that would hopefully lead to the effective ‘Europeanization’ of the internal energy market.
This option seems to have been recognized by the European Commission in one of its com-
munications,19 and there are several examples that support our views. For instance, the Nordic
power market (also known as Nord Pool) is a regional success story which proved that regional
initiatives are well suited to fuse energy markets between EU member states (Palle, 2013, p. 7).
4 Rafael Leal-Arcas et al.
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This bottom-up initiative resulted in the integration of the electricity markets of all Nordic
countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), with the exception of Iceland, and should
be shortly expanding to the Baltic States as well as the UK. Further illustrations of such regional
ventures include the Pentalateral Energy Forum (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland)20 and the Iberian electricity and gas markets (Portugal
and Spain), to name a few (Palle, 2013, p. 7). The aim of all these enterprises is to harmonize
prices and operations as well as to optimize cross-border capacity allocation. Thus, market inte-
gration favours the emergence of ‘European’ energy prices.
Broadly speaking, the security of natural gas supply is a more pressing concern in Central and
Eastern Europe, whilst environmental considerations tend to underlie the energy policies of most
EU member states located in the North-West of the continent (De Jong & Egenhofer, 2014, p. 2).
Regional initiatives which are tailored to address speciﬁc difﬁculties encountered by a particular
area of Europe seem to constitute a preferable alternative to a hasty ‘Schengenization’21 of the EU
energy policy. This perception is further reinforced by the principle of subsidiarity,22 which guar-
antees that action is taken at the lowest appropriate level of government. In that respect, the Euro-
pean Commission notes that
a regional approach has been and will also in the future be decisive for the integration of the European
energy market. It allows for immediate results and can stimulate cross-border exchanges, increase
security of supply and facilitate the integration of renewables. Often cooperation in a smaller
group than the entire EU can go faster and can be better suited to address the particular challenges
of the region concerned.23
The EU has undergone considerable progress over the last few years in its journey towards the
effective materialization of the internal energy market. This drive has engendered a number of
signiﬁcant developments: wholesale electricity prices have remarkably declined, while the
more volatile wholesale gas prices have remained stable since 2008;24 there is a wider range of
choice for consumers in terms of energy suppliers (European Commission, 2014b); more infra-
structure links have been created;25 and cross-border trade in gas and electricity between EU
member states has experienced an upsurge.26
In spite of these auspicious advancements, much remains to be done. More concretely, invest-
ments should be directed towards the gas sector as a means to end the network isolation to which
Baltic States are subjected, by diversifying the energy supplies in Central-Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe.27 In addition, linking the electricity grids within Germany and intra-Baltic
States, those of the Iberian Peninsula, and Ireland as well as the UK with the European continent,
constitutes a prime concern.28 Further challenges that lie ahead include the creation of an inte-
grated offshore grid in the Northern Seas as well as electricity highways that will enable cost-
optimal integration of the EU’s substantial offshore and renewables generation in the power
system.29 On 29 October 2014, EU member states voted in favour of allocating €647 million
to ﬁnance key energy infrastructure projects, three-quarters of which should be completed by
2020 (European Commission, 2015). These initiatives will carry the label of ‘projects of
common interest’ (PCI), which will entitle them to beneﬁt from more expedient granting pro-
cedures as well as an enhanced regulatory treatment.30 These projects will be scattered all over
the European continent and will follow the guidelines instituted by the latest regulation on
trans-European energy infrastructure.31
Moreover, the efﬁciency of the current European electricity infrastructure needs to be
enhanced by establishing smooth and harmonized rules across Europe; these rules should be
adopted by the European Commission (2014a). In addition, public intervention should be
restrained, inasmuch as secure energy ﬂows can be guaranteed by the energy market, since
such interference may undermine investments in the necessary infrastructure and energy efﬁ-
ciency, as well as result in adverse consequences on consumer bills.32 Finally, the role of
Contemporary Politics 5
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consumers within energy markets should become more active and links between wholesale and
retail markets further strengthened in order to make the beneﬁts of the European internal energy
market more apparent on the retail level.33
In sum, referring vaguely to the concept of solidarity in order to trigger a truly comprehensive
European response towards the completion of the internal energy market seems to be somewhat
naïve and illusory. Our premise is that a cohesive European blueprint may be better achieved
through the gradual blending of regional initiatives, instead of hastily pressing for an EU
common position in order to ﬁnalize the European internal energy market. Although a harmo-
nized position by the EU would undoubtedly be preferable to an array of discordant national
measures, our premise is more nuanced. Indeed, pushing ipso facto for an EU common position
in such a delicate and versatile matter as energy might prove counter-productive, especially if the
EU member states involved lack the political will to do so. Instead, we would suggest that a
bottom-up, regional approach could be better suited to ﬁnalize the longed-for European energy
union. One may contend that these regional initiatives (which, as outlined earlier, have already
proven remarkably successful in the past) composed of states confronted with the same
adversities and pursuing similar goals will eventually merge into a coherent European blueprint.
Such an approach might not bring about a truly internal energy market by as hoped for in the
short term. Nonetheless, the advocated resolution presents the advantage of securing the foun-
dations of such an ambitious enterprise by guaranteeing the effective commitment of all EU
member states.
3. The diversiﬁcation of energy supplies
3.1. Increasing the import of LNG
LNG34 is increasingly being perceived as providing the most immediate and promising alternative
EU energy source to Russian gas (Stern et al., 2014, p. 29). This is so for a variety of reasons.
First, LNG presents the invaluable advantage of transportation ﬂexibility, which enables its effec-
tive geographical diversiﬁcation (Brunekreeft & Guliyev, 2009). This point is of vital importance
from a European perspective, as it would enable the EU to deal with alternative energy markets to
Russia’s (such as the USA or Qatar), which are recognized as strategically more reliable, in spite
of involving longer distances, than energy supplies transported via pipelines from and through
conﬂict-ridden or war-torn gateways, as is generally the case. Second, LNG encourages compe-
tition in the market. This is because the tankers and LNG terminals (which constitute the capital)
are geographically less conﬁned than gas pipelines. Therefore, they enable third parties to enter
the market, thereby increasing competition.
Notwithstanding a meager rise in LNG imports to Europe in 2014, European LNG terminals
(which enjoy a total re-gasiﬁcation capacity of 200 billion cubic meters per year) have ample spare
capacity, as their re-gasiﬁcation capacity was less than 22% utilized in 2013 (Stern et al., 2014,
p. 29). The issues of LNG imports displacing Russian gas revolve around the question of
whether LNG supplies can actually be delivered to Central and Eastern Europe (i.e. countries
such as Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia almost entirely
depend on Russian energy exports), and whether LNG prices will be competitive with Russian
gas. Following an assessment of May 2014 by the Commission,35 Central and Eastern European
countries, which are in a particularly vulnerable plight vis-à-vis Russia, have been taking preven-
tive measures. For instance, Lithuania is striving to construct a new LNG terminal, in order to store
and re-gasify LNG supplies originating from alternative energy partners (Buchan, 2014, p. 6).
This initiative was praised by the European Commission as a pivotal advancement towards the
alleviation of the region’s energy hardships, since the Klaipe˙da LNG terminal will readily
ensure LNG supplies to all Baltic States, were Russia to cut-off its gas ﬂows (Seputyte, 2014).
6 Rafael Leal-Arcas et al.
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In spite of having a considerable total re-gasiﬁcation capacity, European LNG terminals are
scattered in a singularly uneven manner across the continent, further deepening the fracture on
the approach adopted by different regions towards energy security. Indeed, most of this re-gasi-
ﬁcation capacity is located in North-West Europe (namely Belgium, France, the Netherlands and
the UK) and South-West Europe (Italy, Portugal and Spain), which accounted for a towering
97.1% of the total European re-gasiﬁcation capacity; South-East Europe (with only one LNG
terminal, based in Greece) merely represented 2.9%, whilst the Baltic region remained idle
on this front, as of 2014.36 Notwithstanding notable improvements being undertaken (especially
with the increase of the network’s capacity to reverse energy ﬂows) following the so-called
security regulation,37 most of the existing European energy infrastructure and grids were orig-
inally assembled with the main purpose of delivering Soviet gas to the West and the South
of Europe. In that sense, the somber circumstances surrounding South-East Europe and the
Baltic States may only be surmounted through prominent investment in new infrastructure
(Stern et al., 2014, p. 37).
Over the last few years, the EU has been striving to ﬁnance and foster LNG terminals across
Europe in order to diversify its sources of supply, thereby revitalizing its energy security. As far as
the ‘danger zones’ alluded to earlier are concerned, the most promising developments seem to be
the Klaipe˙da LNG terminal in Lithuania and the S´winoujs´cie LNG terminal in Poland.38 Indeed,
in spite of having a relatively negligible capacity of nine billion cubic metres,39 their inception
marks the ﬁrst material steps embodying the yearning within that region to overthrow its historic
energy dependence on Russia. Moreover, these auspicious initiatives have inspired other
countries to follow suit. For instance, Latvia is contemplating the construction of an LNG terminal
in Riga; Estonia is working on a number of projects, including Paldiski, Muuga Tallinn and Sil-
lamäe LNG terminals; whilst Croatia is considering the construction of a ﬂoating re-gasiﬁcation
unit in Krk Island, to name a few (Stern et al., 2014, pp. 38–39). Furthermore, many of these
enterprises enjoy a PCI status, thereby entitling them to signiﬁcant licensing and regulatory
beneﬁts, which should hopefully spur their ﬁnalization.40
3.2. The Eurasian Customs Union, the Single Economic Space (SES) and the Eurasian
Union
The dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which followed the Bela-
vezha Accords,41 ushered in several regional integration initiatives (on the collapse of the
Soviet Union – de Tinguy, 1997). As a matter of fact, the Belavezha Accords represent the agree-
ments that declared the Soviet Union effectively dissolved and that established, in its place, the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As Hanson argued, although this agreement was
signed on 8 December 1991 in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, the dissolution of the USSR has its
roots in the systemic reform and revolutionary change adopted in the early 1990s (Hanson,
2004, p. 531). In the ensuing years, other regional organizations such as the Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEC) (WIPO, 2000), the Russia–Belarus Union42 and the Collective Security
Treaty Organisation (CSTO) (ODKB, 2002) were established. Notwithstanding such initiatives,
until recently real integration was absent. The situation appears to have changed only in 2010 with
the entry into force of the Eurasian Customs Union and the following set of agreements that
formed the Single Economic Space (SES)43 in 2012 (Libman & Vinokurov, 2012, p. 29).
The Eurasian Customs Union (CU) of the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and the
Republic of Kazakhstan represents an integrated customs area which forms part of the EurAsEC.
Under such supranational agreement, no customs duties or economic restrictions apply to recipro-
cal trade within the Union’s territory. Its geographical area covers more than 20 million sq. kilo-
metres and includes an overall population of around 170 million people (see Figures 1 and 2).
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The regulatory system adopted by the Eurasian Customs Union resembles that of other
customs unions. In fact, its supreme body is the Interstate Council (the so-called Mezhgossovet)
which, like the European Council, consists of state and government leaders and is presided over
by a chairman elected twice a year. Moreover, as of October 2007, a Customs Union Commission
(CUC) was established as an executive body, whose main task is to assure a proper functioning
and development at the supranational level (Krotov, 2012, p. 130). In accordance with the terms
of an agreement with the Russian government, the CUC, whose executive body is the Secretariat,
is based in Moscow. This structure represents an absolute innovation in the Eurasian context
because, since its beginnings in the 1970s, socialist economic integration traditionally showed
considerable opposition and reluctance to introducing supranational institutions and, conse-
quently, was diametrically opposite in its infrastructural details to the integration strategies
pursued in Western Europe (Butler, 2013, p. 604). The Eurasian Customs Union’s legal and regu-
latory framework, comprising more than 70 international treaties and more than 900 regulations
issued by the Eurasian Economic Commission, achieved full functionality by the end of 2011
(Eurasian Commission, 2013, p. 17).
On 18 November 2011, the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia signed a Declara-
tion on Eurasian Economic Integration, predicated on recognition of the success of the Customs
Union. Consequently, the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council developed a package of inter-
national agreements setting out the legal framework that established a SES, to come into effect
among Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. On 1 January 2012, the SES became eventually oper-
ational (Eurasian Commission, 2013, p. 7). The SES represents a further stage of Eurasian Econ-
omic Integration and is based on the recognition of the so-called ‘four freedoms’ (i.e. the free
movement of goods, capital, services and people) within the SES (Eurasian Commission,
2013, p. 18). The functioning of the SES entails that the member states should pursue coordinated
Figure 1. Eurasian Customs Union’s Geographical Area.
Source: The World Bank – Land Area (2010–2014), available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.
LND.TOTL.K2.
Figure 2. Eurasian Customs Union’s Population (in million of inhabitants).
Source: The World Bank – Data by Country (2013), available at http://data.worldbank.org/country.
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policies in key areas of their economies (e.g. macroeconomics, the ﬁnancial sector, transportation,
energy, trade and industry).
On 29 May 2014, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia signed the agreement on
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), also known as Eurasian Union, which came into effect on 1
January 2015. In October 2014, a treaty was signed to enlarge the EEU to Armenia (Eurasian
Economic Union countries and Armenia arrange to ratify accession agreement soon, 2014). It rep-
resents the most recent stage of Eurasian integration. There are prospects that the EEU will be the
most advanced organization for regional cooperation that the former Soviet bloc has ever seen, an
achievement preceded by many false starts (Vitkine, 2014). According to this project, the Eura-
sian Customs Union and the SES represent the two main pillars of the EEU. The establishment of
the EEU is based on a large codiﬁcation work of the Eurasian Customs Union’s and SES’s laws
and regulations. Such a codiﬁcation is aimed at improving the applicability of the agreements
between member states in several economic areas and deﬁning the path to further Eurasian inte-
gration (Eurasian Commission, 2013, p. 39). From the EU’s perspective, the entry into force of
the Eurasian Union should be regarded, ﬁrst and foremost, as the incarnation of a political project
instigated by President Putin, which represents an alternative to the EU for Eastern European
countries (Garcés De Los Fayos, 2014, p. 5).
3.2.1. Link to the broader European context
There is a variety of cogent reasons that explain the important role that the Eurasian Customs
Union plays in the European context and that justiﬁes the considerable inﬂuence on policy and
decision-making that such a supranational institution and its members might exert within the
EU. Energy policy and security appear to be the common thread running through the several criti-
cal issues that have arisen from the establishment of the CU as well as from its members’ activities
and policies.
First of all, as will be shown in the ensuing part of this section, the EU should be concerned
about Eurasian political instability. Although Russia remains a major military power and attempts
to project its dominance in Eurasia, the fact that a growing degree of instability is affecting the
region calls into question Russia’s capacity for leadership (Mamlyuk, 2014, p. 620). Several
events are emblematic of the political fragility that the entire region is currently suffering. The
so-called ‘Five-Day War’ is a case in point.
On 7 August 2008, Georgian forces responded to attacks by secessionists in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. The rebels were supported by Russian troops deployed as peacekeepers in those
regions 15 years earlier with Georgia’s consent. Because the Georgian attack killed some
Russian soldiers, Moscow intervened and the two countries fought a ﬁve-day bloody war that
killed more than 800 people (King, 2008). On 26 August 2008, the Russian President Medvedev
unilaterally recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Such recognition by
Russia was condemned by the USA, the G7, the secretary-general of the Council of Europe,
the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) chairman because of the violation of Georgia’s
territorial integrity. The conﬂict was motivated by a wish to control strategic oil and gas pipeline
routes and, speciﬁcally, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline as a major route for oil delivery from
Kazakhstan to Europe (Shanahan Cutts, 2008, p. 287).
Moreover, in June 2010, the adoption of a new constitution in Kyrgyzstan that aimed to estab-
lish a parliamentary system of governance resulted in four days of ﬁerce ethnic clashes in the
Southern cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad, leaving as many as 2000 people dead (Toktogulov & Bou-
dreaux, 2010).
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More recently, the 2013–2014 ‘Euromaidan’44 protest in Ukraine led to Russian military
occupation of Crimea and support to rebels in East Ukraine. Such hostile actions seem to rep-
resent a punishment for the Ukrainian decision of moving closer to the EU and refusing to join
the EEU (Vitkine, 2014). The drastic nature of this retaliation appears to be related to the
crucial importance that Ukraine assumes in the Eurasian context. As the former US national secur-
ity adviser put it, ‘without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire’ (Brzezinski, 1998).
Consequently, it is reasonable to suppose that further acts of violence will be perpetrated in
the Caucasian region and that some currently frozen conﬂicts may be re-ignited, including the
one related to Transnistria in Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia and Azerbaijan
(Mamlyuk, 2014, p. 621).
Furthermore, the Eurasian Customs Union is assuming a greater role as a European antagonist
in the confrontation for political and economic control and inﬂuence over the Eurasian region.
According to Butler, the EU holds that some former Soviet Republics, such as Armenia, must
choose between Brussels and Moscow (Butler, 2013, p. 599). As a matter of fact, from a European
perspective, there is an inherent incompatibility between being associated with the EU and being a
member of the Eurasian Customs Union. As reported by the Wall Street Journal, ‘countries in the
Moscow-led customs union can’t be integrated into the EU [… ] because they have effectively
ceded sovereignty over trade issues to Russia’ (Bendavid & Norman, 2013). As a consequence,
in a realist view of power relations, any success for Russia in terms of institutional realignment
with its former Soviet ‘satellites’ represents inevitably a loss for Europe, and vice versa.
The serious deterioration in relations between Armenia and the EU is highly illustrative of this
conﬂicted approach. In fact, Armenia was expected to enter into an Association Agreement with
the EU during the Third Eastern Partnership summit held in Vilnius in November 2013, aimed at
establishing closer cooperation between the EU and its eastern European partners (i.e. Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) (European Union External
Action, 2014). However, on 4 September 2013, the website of the Kremlin in Moscow posted a
brief statement declaring that during a meeting between the President of the Russian Federation,
Vladimir Putin, and the President of the Republic Armenia, Serge Sargsyan, Armenia had dis-
closed its decision to accede to a Customs Union originally formed by Belarus, Kazakhstan
and Russia, rather than sign an Association Agreement with the EU (Bendavid & Norman,
2013). Although foreseeable and convincing motives led to this sudden and complete reversal,
it caused considerable consternation within the EU. In fact, the choice appears to be based on
Armenia’s crucial national interests. In order to obtain the turnaround, Russia used its powerful
economic and military leverage: it is Armenia’s sole natural gas supplier and is able to determine
the price of fuel; moreover, according to a bilateral treaty signed in 1996, there are about 3000
Russian soldiers ofﬁcially reported to be stationed at the 102nd military base located in the Arme-
nian town of Gyumri (Bendavid & Norman, 2013).
3.2.2. The role of energy
In such a complex scenario, energy plays a fundamental role. The dependence of the EU on
energy imports, particularly oil and more recently gas, forms the backdrop for policy concerns
relating to the security of energy supplies. Russia is currently the main exporter of gas and
crude oil to the EU (see Figure 3).
As a consequence, the need to establish a closer dialogue with the Eurasian Customs Union
appears to be unavoidable in the near future. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the EU’s
new Eastern members and aspiring members depend on Russian energy supply more than other
EU member states. In fact, many countries that were members or satellites of the Soviet Union
rely exclusively on gas and oil supply from Russia for their energy consumption. For countries
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such as Poland, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine, obtaining energy independence from Russia
seems even more difﬁcult to achieve within a reasonable time frame. As opposed to Western
Europe, gas pipelines in Eastern European countries mainly follow an east-west direction,
without many interconnections (see Figure 4). As demonstrated during the gas crises between
Figure 3. EU’s Main Origin of Primary Energy Imports (2012).
Source: European Commission – Eurostat, ‘Energy production and imports’, available at http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports.
Figure 4. European Gas Pipelines.
Source: Exectech – Europe’s Dependence on Russian Gas, available at https://executivetechnology.
wordpress.com/2014/11/09/europes-dependence-on-russian-gas-part-2/.
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Ukraine and Russia in 2006 and 2009, the absence of interconnections makes it almost impossible
to provide gas to Eastern European countries in the event of a sudden interruption of supply from
Russia. It is therefore not surprising that the EU is not only trying to improve the diversiﬁcation of
sources and routes of oil and gas furnishing but also to enhance the security of energy supply
through the establishment of a Central Eastern European Pipeline Ring, aimed at closing the
gaps in the existing network (European Commission, 2011).
3.2.3. Russian energy companies
In order to establish a dialogue on energy issues with the Eurasian Customs Union, Europeans
inevitably need to build up a commercial relationship with the main Russian giant oil companies.
The central complication here arises from the fact that, due to the strong inﬂuence that the Russian
government exerts on these companies, they operate more like national oil companies than private
companies, which renders the creation of a TPN more difﬁcult because of lack of transparency
and independence. They do not seek to only maximize proﬁts, but also have politically driven
aims such as fostering foreign and strategic policies, wealth redistribution and job creation
(Olsen, 2013, p. 618). Because of profound differences in pursued policies, establishing a dialo-
gue with these companies appears dependent upon more intense mediation by the EU institutions.
In this context, it is necessary to highlight signiﬁcant features that distinguish the main
Russian oil companies from all other international oil companies. Speciﬁcally, both Gazprom,
the largest Russian gas producer, and Rosneft, which is the largest Russian oil producer (see
Figure 5), will be brieﬂy analyzed.
Gazprom. Gazprom’s CEO, Aleksej Borisovicˇ Miller, was politically appointed and is seen as one
of Vladimir Putin’s most trusted lieutenants. This fact is emblematic of the inﬂuence exerted by
the government on the company (Olsen, 2013, p. 627). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
company has represented an extension of Russia’s foreign policy in Europe. In the 1990s,
Figure 5. Russia’s oil and natural gas production by company (2012).
Source: Eastern Bloc Energy, available at http://www.easternblocenergy.com.
12 Rafael Leal-Arcas et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
69
.25
5.1
60
.23
9]
 at
 08
:21
 14
 Ju
ly 
20
15
 
Gazprom entered into joint ventures with several companies in Germany, France, Italy and
Finland and, by 1995, it already accounted for 21% of the Western European market and 55%
of the Eastern European market (Poussenkova, 2010, p. 107). The signiﬁcance of Gazprom as
a fundamental actor in the energy sector can also be seen in the fact that the pipelines
managed by the company are essential to the economies of Eurasian countries. The 2004 crisis
with Belarus and, more recently, the gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine of 2006 and
2009 (Poussenkova, 2010, p. 117) are illustrative of Gazprom’s strategic relevance and its will-
ingness to adopt an aggressive approach to foster Russian economic and political interests.
In order to reduce its dependence on Ukraine as a transit country and to foster Russia’s geopo-
litical aspirations, Gazprom has recently shown great interest in expanding its pipelines (Olsen,
2013, p. 629). In particular, it organized the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline, which
runs under the Baltic Sea, with the capacity of 55 billion cubic metres annually. Gazprom signed
for a 51% share in a joint venture with two German companies (EON Ruhrgas and BASF/Winter-
shall) (Tarasov, 2011, p. 77). Moreover, Gazprom participated in the South Stream pipeline project
as a response to the European and American plan for constructing Nabucco, a 3300-km-long pipe-
line going from Turkey to Austria through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary in order to obtain gas
directly fromCentral Asian countries such asAzerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran (see Figure 6) and,
consequently, make Europe more independent of Russian supply (Tarasov, 2011, p. 84).
The statement issued by the then President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso
appears emblematic of the importance that such a pipeline had for Europe: ‘The Nabucco project
is of crucial importance for Europe’s energy security and its policy of diversiﬁcation of gas
supplies and transport routes’ (European Commission, 2009). In 2010, Putin intervened,
signing an agreement with Turkey forbidding the Nabucco pipeline to pass through Turkish ter-
ritory in exchange for supporting another pipeline to be built in Turkey. As a result, by the end of
2012, the Nabucco project was ofﬁcially abandoned, whereas the construction of the South
Stream pipeline was initiated (Olsen, 2013, p. 631) but eventually abandoned. This project
would have allowed Gazprom to send its gas to Southern and Central Europe via a pipeline
under the Black Sea (see Figure 6).
Figure 6. Nabucco and South Stream Pipeline Projects.
Source: BBC – Gazprom to control Serbia’s oil, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/
7799396.stm.
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Despite the enormous costs and difﬁculties of building such a pipeline, Gazprom repeatedly
said it was committed to the project. In the absence of other valid economic reasons for the
company, its main purpose appears to be to undermine European ambitions of reducing depen-
dence on Russia’s gas supply by means of the construction of Nabucco.
In conclusion, Gazprom has actively sought to thwart any European attempt to obtain energy
supply from other nations and its expansionist ambitions have caused a signiﬁcant political
instability in the Eurasian context (Olsen, 2013, p. 631). Moreover, Gazprom has become the
Kremlin’s faithful servant and dangerous sword. Its role in today’s Russia is best described by
an old cliché: ‘what is good for Gazprom is good for Russia’ (Poussenkova, 2010, p. 111).
Rosneft. Rosneft’s relevance among Russian oil companies grew exponentially after Vladimir
Putin was elected president in 2000. Rosneft was chosen by Putin as an instrument to achieve
his aim of establishing state control over the Russian energy sector. As a consequence, Rosneft
consolidated its assets, becoming a national oil company (Olsen, 2013, p. 624). However, it
acquired its strategic importance after the elimination of its rival gas company Yukos.
At the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century, Yukos was one of the largest private oil companies in
the world and the largest in Russia (e.g. in 2003 it produced 589.11 million barrels of oil equiv-
alent and signed important deals to export to both China and USA) (Poussenkova, 2010, p. 110).
In the early 2000s, the CEO of Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, challenged Putin and his party,
United Russia. Consequently, in 2003, Khodorkovsky was arrested and his company was
accused of crimes, including tax evasion, by the Russian government. Throughout the summer
of 2004, the government betrayed its real objective by announcing its intention to sell off
Yukos’ stock. The Baikal Finance Group, a shell company (i.e. a corporation without active
business operations or signiﬁcant assets), created two weeks before the auction and registered
at the same address as a grocery store in the provincial Russian town of Tver, put in the only
bid above the reservation price and then, eventually, Rosneft acquired Yukos’ most valuable
assets. This move ended days of speculation over what has been deﬁned as one of the most
bizarre and controversial sell-offs in Russian history (Belton, 2004).
The ﬁnal liquidation of the company occurred in the fall of 2007 and all the assets of Russia’s
largest energy company passed into the hands of Rosneft (Stephan, 2013, p. 25). Rosneft has
more than tripled its daily production in barrels of oil, becoming, since 2007, the largest oil pro-
ducer in Russia. However, the arrest of Khodorkovsky and the seizure of Yukos’ assets seriously
weakened investors’ conﬁdence in the integrity of the Russian economy and many of them moved
their capital out of the Russian market (Waltrip, 2008, p. 584). It appears evident that the massive
expansion of this Russian energy corporation has its roots in a symbiotic relationship between the
company and the government and, speciﬁcally, in the interests pursued by Putin and his entourage
of oligarchs (Poussenkova, 2010, p. 103). The Khodorkovsky affair and the prominent role that
Rosneft has currently assumed among Russian oil companies make it hard to keep believing in the
project – launched after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 – for creating a ‘new Russia’
through the privatization of industry, housing and land (Goldman, 2004, p. 33).
4. EU engagement with energy TPNs: an International Energy Charter
This section aims at showing the EU’s inﬂuence and engagement in energy networks. Its involve-
ment has shaped the EU’s approach to energy security very successfully, as discussed below. This
shows that the EU should continue to be engaged with energy TPNs moving forward.
Ever since Russia hastily withdrew from the ECT, there has been an unyielding resolution
towards the modernization of the Energy Charter, which seems to be slowly but surely
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materializing into concrete steps. Most notably, at the time of writing, there are rounds of nego-
tiations regarding the creation of an International Energy Charter, which is intended to be formally
adopted and signed at a Ministerial Conference in The Hague in 2015 (Energy Charter, 2014). An
enlightening draft of the proposed text has already been released.45 This declaration reﬂects the
ambition of the Energy Charter to play an important role in the evolving architecture of global
energy governance. Given the seemingly far-reaching consequences of this advancement, one
may ask: what exactly will be the differences between the old and the new Charter?
First, the new Charter will seek to get rid of the perceived geographical ties with Europe. The
new Charter will depict a new vision of energy security by deﬁning the concept in such a manner
that will enable the term to encompass not solely security of supply, but also other perspectives
such as predictability of demand, safety of transit and absence of energy poverty (Beckman,
2014). In terms of their legal nature, the new Charter will merely be a political declaration
which will lay out common principles for international cooperation in the ﬁeld of energy
(Energy Charter Secretariat, 2014, p. 1). Moreover, the new Charter will endeavor to accurately
interpret and identify the new energy challenges of the current volatile juncture. Indeed, the need
to replace ageing infrastructure, coupled with the unbridled growth of renewables and the estab-
lishment of new climate goals, exacerbates the uncertainty amidst investors as to where to invest
(Beckman, 2014). Therefore, by clearly singling out the most pressing issues, the new Charter
should empower countries to develop a luring investment climate through the waning of these
trade and investment uncertainties within the energy sector.
The major challenge for the new Charter will be to attract nations which enjoy momentous
energy wealth. The legitimacy and credibility of a new global agreement on energy would cer-
tainly, at best, be questionable were energy giants such as Russia or Saudi Arabia to articulate
a blunt reluctance to the conclusion of such a treaty. In that sense, the new Charter will have
to break free from the, alleged, aura of favoritism towards European hardships and goals that
the current Energy Charter unpins. An international agreement which takes into consideration
the disparate energy realities encountered by the various nations around the globe would enjoy
greater recognition and hopefully become a cornerstone of more cohesive international energy
governance for the future. In a similar vein, one may argue that the negotiations on this new
Charter may provide an optimal platform for Europe and Russia to reconcile their wildly discor-
dant stands on the energy front. In that sense, it is a remarkably telling fact that the current nego-
tiations are held in English with Russian translation and that one of the ofﬁcial languages of the
new Charter is Russian (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2014, p. 5).
These great expectations should be tempered by recalling that the updated Energy Charter will
merely have a political nature.46 That said, one may contend that the purely voluntary essence of
this visionary enterprise might be pivotal towards achieving a larger consensus between countries
of all continents confronted with eminently divergent energy afﬂictions and aspirations. By laying
down harmonized principles which truthfully reﬂect the current dynamics of the international
energy scenery, one may anticipate that an initial political agreement on these matters might
be the prelude to a more daring and ambitious multilateral legally binding treaty. If this more
affable setting enables the accord of a vast number of energy importers and exporters, the
advent of the new Charter will represent an unsurpassable opportunity to push for the enlargement
of the Energy Charter’s membership to energy-rich countries in, inter alia, the Middle East, North
Africa and the Economic Community of West African States, thereby constituting a further
avenue towards the enhancement of EU energy security through the creation of an infrastructure
that will boost international, long-distance trade in energy.
In order to accentuate Europe’s determination to truly diversify its sources of energy supplies,
all EU member states should seek to trade with as many suppliers as possible. As a means to press
for the fulﬁllment of this particular goal, a norm, whereby each signatory of the ECT should not
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rely on a single supplier outside its own continent for more than 50% of its primary energy needs,
should be enshrined in the International Energy Charter. Why 50%? One may contend that this
target (50%) has, arguably, the merit of being challenging enough so as to spur EU member
states and other ECT signatories to resolutely diversify their sources of energy supply. Moreover,
from the EU’s point of view, such a rule would imply drastic changes in the energy policies of
many of its member states (particularly those located in Central and Eastern Europe). Indeed,
countries such as Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia
almost entirely depend on Russian energy exports. As to the 50% target per se, one may argue that
given the current energy juncture within the European continent (characterized by the Russian
stronghold on energy supplies), the ﬁgure acknowledges the difﬁculty of the task, whilst remain-
ing daring and ambitious.
While waiting for the developments regarding the new Charter to unfold, one may argue that
(except for Australia, the Caspian countries and Norway) most of the ECT parties are also craving
energy importers, especially after Russia’s withdrawal from the ECT. Therefore, these states may
beneﬁt from such a rule by diversifying their sources of energy supply for their own sake. In a
similar vein, taking into account, the arguably, moderate success of the EU’s self-indulgent
strife to promote its regional energy interests through the ECT, we suggest that embracing a
more constructive and comprehensive approach by truly acknowledging the energy woes of
other states would be more effective towards the attainment of global energy security which,
in turn, would entail positive consequences for Europe.
In sum, we contend that, the current winds of change, through the prospected advent of an
International Energy Charter in 2015, provide a preeminent chance to modernize the current
Energy Charter in order for the International Energy Charter to adequately confront the current
threats that loom over the international energy landscape. The new Charter could play a key
role in the carving of the future architecture of global energy governance. To do so, the anticipated
International Energy Charter will have to encompass the very diverse energy afﬂictions that smite
all states around the globe, by redeﬁning the term energy security, to gather major energy players
and pave the way for more cohesive international energy governance.
5. Conclusion
From energy transit, to technology transfer, to investment protection, energy and trade present
interplays across various ﬁelds. Improvements can be made to the EU trading system to ensure
greater energy security and more efﬁcient energy markets. The international community could
create single energy markets at the regional level in different regions of the world (e.g. the internal
energy market in the EU) and then connect the various regions (inter-regional connection of
energy agreements). This entails the interconnection of grids and transit rules, which would
provide energy security globally. Here is where the notion of energy TPNs can play a major
role moving forward, both for the EU’s own energy networks and more generally energy net-
works around the globe. Moreover, the expansion of the Energy Charter’s membership to
countries in the Middle East and North Africa and to the Economic Community of West
African States may be an avenue to enhance EU energy security through the creation of an infra-
structure that will enhance international, long-distance trade in energy. Also, the promotion of
sustainable energy use abroad may, in the long run, contribute towards EU energy security
indirectly by making more efﬁcient use of energy resources globally.
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Notes
1. The EU is 54% energy dependent on the outside world. See Rostowska (2014, p. 1).
2. That said, given the high cost of LNG infrastructure, an alternative way to enhance EU energy security
would be through renewable energy, which is currently expensive. Southern Europe is blessed with sun-
light; there is a lot of wind in northern Europe. The EU should therefore explore renewables as a long-
term mechanism to achieve energy security and subsidies should go to this industry to make it cost-
effective.
3. http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=21&id_article=568&L=0. To access the document of the pro-
posed International Energy Charter, see http://www.encharter.org/ﬁleadmin/user_upload/document/
IEC_ENG.pdf
4. European Commission, Key Figures, Market Observatory for Energy, Directorate-General for Energy,
p. 8 (June 2013).
5. The EU alone is able to legislate and adopt binding acts in these ﬁelds. The role of the member states is
therefore limited to applying these acts, unless the Union authorizes them to adopt certain acts them-
selves. Certain energy-related matters fall within exclusive EU competence, such as the competitive con-
ditions of energy trade within the internal market, for instance. Article 3 TFEU.
6. Both the EU and member states are authorized to adopt binding acts in these ﬁelds. However, member
states may exercise their competence only in so far as the EU has not exercised, or has decided not to
exercise, its own competence. Energy, in its wide sense, is expressly referred to as a matter of shared
competence between the EU and its member states. Article 4 TFEU.
7. Article 67 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community.
8. Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament: An
Energy Policy for Europe, at p. 3, COM(2007) 1 ﬁnal (10 January 2007).
9. Conclusions of the European Council of 4 February 2011 (pp. 1–2), available at http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119141.pdf
10. Conclusions of the European Council of 21 March 2014 (p. 1), available at http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141749.pdf
11. Regulation (EC) No 67/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009,
laying down general rules for the granting of Community ﬁnancial aid in the ﬁeld of trans-European
networks.
12. Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (19 December 1996) concerning
common rules for the internal market in electricity; Directive 98/30 of the European Parliament and
of the Council (22 June 1998) concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas.
13. European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) in 2003 and Gas
(ENTSO-G) in 2005.
14. The EU’s Third Energy Package is a legislative package for an internal gas and electricity market with
the purpose of further opening up these markets in the EU. It consists of two directives and three regu-
lations: Directive 2009/72/EC, concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity; Directive
2009/73/EC, concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas; Regulation (EC) No 714/
2009, on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity; Regulation (EC)
No 715/2009, on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks; and Regulation (EC) No
713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the
Cooperation of Energy Regulators.
15. Ownership unbundling is the
process by which a large company with several different lines of business retains one or more core
businesses and sells off the remaining assets, product/service lines, divisions or subsidiaries. Unbund-
ling is done for a variety of reasons, but the goal is always to create a better performing company or
companies.
Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unbundling.asp.
16. European Parliament, ‘Towards a European Energy Community for the 21st century?’ Directorate-
General for Internal Policies of the Union (p. 12), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/
webdav/site/myjahiasite/users/nsalliarelis/public/BN%20on%20June%202010%20JPM.pdf
17. A top-down approach to a problem is a situation that begins at the highest conceptual level and works
down to the details. An example of such an approach would be where targets are set out at the inter-
national level and must be attained through national policies and measures.
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18. A bottom-up approach to a problem is one that begins with details and works up to the highest concep-
tual level. An example of such an approach would be where action starts at the national level based on
each country’s circumstances through a patchwork of national policies and measures (which are not
necessarily binding) until they develop into uniﬁed policies at the international plane.
19. See, for instance, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Progress towards com-
pleting the Internal Energy Market, at p. 15, COM(2014) 634 ﬁnal (13 October 2014).
20. In 2005, the energy ministers of Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands created
the Pentalateral Energy Forum in order to promote collaboration in the ﬁeld of cross-border exchange of
electricity. See http://economie.fgov.be/en/consumers/Energy/Energy_policy/International_context/
Pentalateral_Energy_Forum/. Austria and Switzerland joined at a later stage.
21. The term Schengenization refers to the Schengen Agreement, which abolishes passport or any other
form of intra-European border control among the 26 participating European countries, thereby establish-
ing a common internal visa policy.
22. The principle of subsidiarity aims to determine the level of intervention that is best suited to address a
task which falls within the areas of competences shared between the EU and its member states. Action
may be taken at the EU, national or local level. The EU may only intervene when its intervention would
prove more effective than that of its member states. See Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union.
23. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Progress towards completing the Internal
Energy Market, at p. 9, COM(2014) 634 ﬁnal (13 October 2014).
24. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Econ-
omic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Energy prices and costs in Europe, at
p. 6, COM(2014) 21 ﬁnal (22 January 2014).
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Progress towards completing the Internal
Energy Market, at p. 15, COM(2014) 634 ﬁnal (13 October 2014).
28. Ibid. at 9.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (17 April 2013) on guide-
lines for trans-European energy infrastructure.
32. Communication from the Commission: Delivering the internal electricity market and making the most of
public intervention, at p. 18, C(2013) 7243 ﬁnal (5 November 2013).
33. ‘Common rules and Infrastructure needed to complete Energy Market’, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
energy/infrastructure/pci/pci_en.htm.
34. LNG is a gas (usually methane) which has been cooled to −162°C, where it condenses into a liquid
phase. Compared to its gaseous form, LNG’s energy density is 600 times greater, which enables
marine transportation.Szalai (20 August 2012).
35. European Commission, ‘In-depth study of European Energy Security,’ accompanying the document
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: European energy
security strategy, SWD(2014) 330 ﬁnal/3 (2 July 2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/
20140528_energy_security_study.pdf.
36. These ﬁgures are calculated based on data as they appear in Gas Infrastructure Europe, Gas LNG Europe
LNG Map, available at http://www.gie.eu/download/maps/2014/GLE_LNG_JUNE2014.pdf.
37. Regulation (EU) 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (20 October 2010) concerning
measures to safeguard security of gas supply.
38. European Commission, ‘A boost for clean and secure energy in Poland: European Commission
approves more than € 200 million EU regional funds for liqueﬁed natural gas terminal’ press release
(16 July 2013), p. 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/hahn/projects/pdf/pl_
2013_07_16_liqueﬁed_natural_gas_terminal.pdf.
39. These ﬁgures are calculated based on data as they appear in Gas Infrastructure Europe, GLE LNG Map,
available at http://www.gie.eu/download/maps/2014/GLE_LNG_JUNE2014.pdf.
40. This information can be accessed in the Excel format of the GLE Map Dataset (version 2014), available
at http://www.gie.eu.com/index.php/maps-data/lng-map.
41. International Legal Materials [ILM] (1992, p. 138).
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42. ILM (1996, p. 1190).
43. http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/Pages/ses.aspx.
44. Euromaidan refers to the wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine, which began in November
2013 and whose aim was to bring Ukraine closer to the EU.
45. See the proposed text at http://www.encharter.org/ﬁleadmin/user_upload/document/IEC_ENG.pdf.
46. Ibid, p. 1.
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